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 Resumo/Abstract: 
 
The purpose of the paper is to explore, from an assessment viewpoint, the ideas below. 
Economics, as a social science, has always considered sets of individuals with 
assumed characteristics, namely the level of knowledge, although in an implicit way in 
most of the cases. In this sense, an influential approach in Economics assumed that 
society, as a global set of individuals, was characterised by a certain level of knowledge 
that, indeed, could be associated with the one of its representative agent. In fact, an 
attentive recall of the evolution of these matters in Economics will immediately 
recognise that, since the very first economic models of the government, it was assumed 
that the level of knowledge of society, represented by a set of voters, was not the same 
as the one of the agent being elected, i.e. the government. The irrelevance of the 
difference in the level of knowledge of economic agents was soon abandoned after 
some seminal works of Hayek and Friedman. More recently, the viewpoint of 
Economics has changed by focusing on the characteristics (e.g. knowledge) of 
individuals, who may interact in sub-sets of society. From this point of view is clearly 
relevant, given the close connection with the assumed level of knowledge, to distinguish 
the adaptive behaviour from the rational one, as well as the full rational from the 
bounded rationality behaviour by people. Quite recent developments in the Economics 
of Knowledge, i.e. the so-called learning models, have been considered as more 
realistic approaches to model the process by which individuals acquire knowledge, for 
instance from other individuals that are, themselves, acquiring knowledge. 
 
Palavras-chave/Keywords: Bounded Rationality, Economics of Knowledge, Knowledge, Learning, 
Rationality 
 
Classificação JEL/JEL Classification:  A12, B41, C91, D83 
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1. A structural introduction 
 
Economics, as a social science, has always considered sets of individuals with 
assumed characteristics, namely the level of knowledge, although in an implicit 
way in most of the cases. In this sense, an influential approach in Economics 
assumed that society, as a global set of individuals, was characterised by a 
certain level of knowledge that, indeed, could be associated with the one of its 
representative agent. In fact, an attentive recall of the evolution of these matters 
in Economics will immediately recognise that, since the very first economic 
models of the government, it was assumed that the level of knowledge of 
society, represented by a set of voters, was not the same as the one of the agent 
being elected, i.e. the government, this fact being evident, for instance, at the 
time horizon being considered. All these questions are subject to a succinct 
analysis in section 2 of our paper. 
The irrelevance of the difference in the level of knowledge of economic 
agents was soon abandoned after some seminal works of Hayek and Friedman. 
In fact, as it will be pointed out below, the importance of these two authors in 
the methodology of Economics goes well beyond their contribution to the 
analysis of knowledge in Economics. This will be made clear in section 3 of our 
paper. 
More recently, the viewpoint of Economics has changed by focusing on 
the characteristics (e.g. knowledge) of individuals, who may interact in sub-
sets of society. From this point of view is clearly relevant, given the close 
connection with the assumed level of knowledge, to distinguish the adaptive 
behaviour (i.e. the one where the knowledge, not even about the past, is fully 
exploited) from the rational one (i.e. the one where all the knowledge, even 
about the future, is optimally exploited). All these matters are to be analysed in 
section 4 of our paper. 
In our opinion, quite recent developments in the Economics of 
Knowledge, i.e. the so-called learning models, have been considered as more 
 2 
realistic approaches to model the process by which individuals acquire 
knowledge, for instance from other individuals that are, themselves, acquiring 
knowledge. In fact, these models also allow to make the distinction between 
the full rational behaviour (i.e. the one where all the available knowledge is 
subject to an optimal use), from the bounded rationality behaviour by people, 
who prefer to adopt a satisficing approach, even in what concerns the use of 
knowledge. These issues are subject to a concise analysis in section 5 of our 
paper, which, in conjunction to section 4, can be seen as the bulk part of our 
analysis.1 
 
2. From the representative agent hypothesis to the non-representative agent 
solution based upon knowledge 
 
In what concerns the level of knowledge by people, an influential approach in 
Economics started considering it as being represented by the one characterising 
a certain individual. The representative agent hypothesis is based upon a 
rational – in the sense of maximizing the (expected) utility – behaviour of the 
representative individual, from which are derived the aggregate counterparts. 
In doing so, it is assumed that the representative agent knows the 
microeconomic equations from which the aggregate counterparts are derived. 
Given that aggregation issues seem to be ignored, Kirman (1992) proposed 
that the heterogeneity of agents should not be reduced to that analytical 
convenience. In fact, given the preferences and constraints of an individual, it is 
quite simple to model the behaviour of this individual – under the usual, but 
not innocuous, hypotheses. To model the behaviour of a group of people is 
obviously more difficult, in particular when individuals interact and, notably, 
when they are not all alike. 
Plainly, in the case of representative agent models, the aggregation of 
the level of knowledge, assumed to be a characteristic of the representative 
                                                     
1 Trying to escape from the trap of formalism we leave for annexes the (mathematical) formalizations of 
the arguments presented in each section. These formalizations appear immediately after a brief 
conclusion. 
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individual, would not add to the level of knowledge that an agent, such as 
Government, assumed also to be a representative agent (of society’s interests), 
should consider when taking decisions, that are supposed to be the best from 
the point of view of the set of individuals constituting the society. 
In the particular case of government, as an agent taking decisions on 
behalf of society, there is, in fact, a matter of knowledge that makes it distinct 
from the rest of the people (even from the electorate that has elected it). As is 
well-known, elections can be seen as one of the – if not the – oldest ways of 
delegating decision power. Voters, through an electoral process, elect an agent 
who is supposed to take decisions, for instance implementing economic 
policies, which are the best for society. These decisions are supposed to be 
even better than those that would be taken by voters themselves. This 
traditional vision derives from the consideration that the government should 
essentially be an agent that can, and indeed should, have a more distant time 
horizon than voters or society do. Notably, this means that, when the 
electorate votes for a government which has implemented policies that have 
generated pleasurable outcomes and this is viewed as a bad phenomenon, it is 
because voters possess a shorter-sight view of the economy. In the limiting 
case, if voters are viewed as agents with the same time horizon as government, 
then a positive election result should be viewed as exactly what the society 
wants, if we consider the electorate as representative of society. In any case, 
the voters’ objective should be to make government choose policies that are 
optimal from the society’s point of view. Notwithstanding, this would require 
some knowledge by voters about the level of knowledge needed to force the 
incumbent not to behave as opportunistic, i.e. when creating an electoral cycle 
by exploiting the lack of knowledge by the electorate. 
In reality, an electoral cycle created by governments is a phenomenon 
that seems to characterise, at least in some particular occasions and/or 
circumstances, the democratic economies. As it is generally accepted, the 
short-run electorally-induced fluctuations hinder the long-run welfare. Since 
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the very first studies on the matter, some authors offered suggestions as to 
what should be done against this electorally-induced instability. For some 
authors, ever since the seminal paper of Nordhaus (1975), a good alternative to 
the obvious proposal to increase the electoral period length is to consider that 
voters abandon a passive and naive behaviour and, instead, are willing to learn 
about government’s intentions. 
In the limit, the acquisition of knowledge through learning makes it 
possible to take strategic decisions. For instance, strategic voting, ever since 
studied by MacRae (1977), may, in fact, make the electorally-motivated 
government to choose socially-optimal economic policies. This can be done by 
strategically changing the relative importance of objectives on the election day.2 
For that to happen, it is enough that voting decisions do not reflect (in the 
correct way) the social importance of economic variables. In other words, from 
the society’s point of view, a non-representative behaviour of voters may 
induce the government to behave as a representative agent of society’s 
interests. This would then mean that the government, assumed to know as 
much as the electorate, whose interests are pursued by governmental 
decisions, would then make decisions that are those that society would make 
itself, in case of knowing everything needed to acknowledge that, in fact, those 
were the best decisions from its viewpoint.3 
As said before, the existence of democratic elections may be associated 
with some short-run electorally-induced fluctuations that, indeed, prejudice 
the long-run welfare, this being the result of an intentionally created 
                                                     
2 Note that as, for instance in Nordhaus (1975), the aggregate voting function is considered as the 
appropriate social welfare function. In fact, the assumption that the objective-function reflects both the 
government’s and the society’s preferences has been present in most of the relevant literature. 
3 This solution seems to suffer from an intrinsic incongruence as it requires a level of knowledge not 
available to the electorate. By the use of a principal-agent approach, Caleiro (2004) provides an alternative 
solution to this problem. As it is apparent that voters should have good reasons for motivating the 
government to act as a benevolent social-planner, it is analysed the circumstances under which an optimal 
contract can be established between the public and the government in order to guarantee enough 
motivation for the agent/government, to behave in accordance with the true interests of the 
principal/public. Barro (1973) already used a principal-agent approach to analyse how re-election motives 
can be used to control politicians, therefore avoiding over-spending. In fact, principal-agent models deal 
with an issue related to the level of knowledge, in the sense that the principal delegates the realization of 
a task to an agent and does not know how much is effort is put forward by the agent. 
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instability, which is possible to create due to some lack of knowledge of the 
electorate. Still, there are other sources of economic destabilization, not being 
created on purpose, are the result of a lack of knowledge by the economic 
authorities, such as the government. This is, in our opinion, the result that 
Friedman’s introduced and that, from the issues related to knowledge, is one of 
the most influential in the methodology proposed by Friedman. 
 
3. From Friedman’s to Hayek’s contributions on the role of knowledge in 
Economics 
 
When assuming itself as an economic policy agent, the government can, 
effectively, have an important role in the economic stabilization. But, if it uses 
its powers in an imprudent or perverse way it will be able, by itself, to be a 
generating source of instability/cyclical uncertainty. In this sense, the 
stabilization function of the State can, in some way, be challenged. In general, 
two aspects have been pointed out that contribute to the possibility of the 
disturbances in the economic activity being caused by the agents responsible 
for the economic policies themselves: 
1. As it happens with electoral cycles, the government, having perfect 
knowledge of the consequences, can take measures that destabilize the 
economy because it has objectives leading to that, namely, the desire of 
being re-elected; 
2. However, even if the government intends only to achieve economic 
objectives of stabilizing the economy, that obviously does not mean that 
it will always be able to obtain that result. As a matter of fact, a 
condition for success of the stabilization policy is the existence of 
perfect control on the sign/value of the effect of economic policy 
measures, on the moment that the effects are in practice, as well as the 
knowledge of the economic situation that will be verified when those 
economic policies start to produce its effects. Thus, the elaboration of an 
economic policy and its implementation at the certain moment is a 
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difficult task. Therefore, it is entirely possible that this attempt of 
stabilization has results contrary to the ones desired. This is, in fact, the 
main argument that monetarists, such as Friedman, use to criticize the 
active (discretionary) actuation of the economic authorities (see Annex 
1 for a formalization of these arguments). 
The case illustrated in the Annex 1, even if only from an implicit point 
of view, indicates the methodology that Friedman has proposed in a seminal 
work (Friedman, 1953a) after some tentative introduction in Friedman (1946). 
In fact, following Friedman’s ideas, the construction of a positive approach in 
Economics should involve the assessment of a theory based upon its predictive 
success while setting apart unrealistic assumptions, which are often present in 
the formalist strand of Economics. 
For the matters under discussion, Friedman’s own words (Friedman, 
1946: 631), quoted in Hands (2003: 5), are the most striking: 
 
“A man […] who has a strong desire to learn how the 
economic system really works in order that knowledge may be 
used, is not likely to stay within the bounds of a method of 
analysis that denies him the knowledge he seeks. He will escape 
the shackles of formalism, […] A far better way is to try to 
derive theoretical generalizations to fit as full and 
comprehensive set of related facts about the real world as it is 
possible to get.” (italics added) 
 
The importance of Friedman in what concerns the methodological 
aspects in Economics has an evident (precedent) parallel in Hayek’s 
contributions, from which we obviously point out the ones on the relationship 
between Economics and Knowledge.4 In a major work (Hayek, 1945) Hayek 
                                                     
4 Boulding (1966) is an interesting reference on the relationship between Economics and Knowledge 
where the possibility of assuming Knowledge to be a good is discussed. In fact, the recent views on the 
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explores the limits of human knowledge in order to attack the centrally-planned 
functioning of the economies. Given that the knowledge needed to solve the 
economic calculation problem is not available to central planners, Hayek advocates 
that only a free functioning economy could provide price signals allowing to 
share and synchronize personal knowledge, which is intrinsically disperse and 
incomplete. This, in turn, would coordinate individuals’ actions, allowing 
society’s members to achieve diverse, complicated goals through a principle of 
spontaneous self-organization. In his own words: 
 
“The peculiar character of the problem of a rational economic 
order is determined precisely by the fact that the knowledge of 
the circumstances of which we must make use never exists in 
concentrated or integrated form but solely as the dispersed bits 
of incomplete and frequently contradictory knowledge which 
all the separate individuals possess. The economic problem of 
society […] it is a problem of the utilization of knowledge 
which is not given to anyone in its totality.” (Hayek, 1945: 
519) 
 
Hayek’s criticism on the possibility to solve the economic calculation 
problem through a central planner is also based upon what he called to be a 
scientism, often present in social sciences and, in particular, in Economics. This 
would correspond to an erroneous approach, so much in vogue, to reduce 
complex, dynamic, non-linear systems to caricatures of reality based upon 
some analytical convenient simplifications through assumptions. This point, in 
conjunction with the alleged limits to human knowledge, makes Hayek a 
precursor of some models of learning and memory, which are about to be 
                                                                                                                                                           
importance of “knowledge-based economies” are, in some sense, related to the fact that knowledge is a 
good with an interesting economic value (see, also, Foray, 2006). 
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presented further below.5 
 
4. From not willing to know how to learn to knowing (almost) everything 
 
The importance of knowledge in Economics is most evident when taking into 
account the role of expectations. With some exceptions, it is possible to 
identify two clearly distinct phases in what concerns the level of knowledge 
assumed to be present when forming expectations. The first one, which took 
place in the 1970s, considered the existence of adaptive expectations by naïve 
agents. In accordance with the rational expectations revolution, in the 1980s 
the second phase of models considered fully rational expectations. Plainly, in 
the first case, agents are not willing to know why are they making systematic 
mistakes whereas in the last case agents know everything needed to prevent 
making systematic errors when forming expectations. 
In simple terms, adaptive expectations are the ones where the expected 
value, computed at time t-1, for period t of a variable, y, is a weighted average 
of the value assumed by this variable at period t-1 and the value expected for 
that variable at period t-1, i.e. ( ) .1 11 −− −+= tetet yyy αα  Plainly, this means that 
knowledge, not even the one about the past, is fully exploited. Rational 
expectations are those computed (optimally) using all the information, I, 
available at the period of computation, say t-1, i.e. [ ]1| −= ttet IyEy . Plainly, this 
means that all knowledge, even the one about the future, is optimally 
exploited. 
Undoubtedly, the level of knowledge is the key when distinguishing the 
two types of expectations – see Annex 2 for a formalisation – and its 
importance becomes clearer when taking into account the consequences of 
rational expectations, such as the irrelevance of policies or decisions – see 
Annex 3 for a formalisation – the time inconsistency of policies or decisions – 
                                                     
5 Interestingly, a model of Hayek based upon some sort of Hebbian learning can be viewed as a precursor 
of neural networks as bounded rationality devices of learning (see section 5 below). 
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see Annex 4 for a formalisation – as well as the delegation of policies or 
decisions – see Annex 5 for a formalisation. 
Given its relationship to the issues under consideration, it is interesting 
to point out that the time inconsistency of decisions, as illustrated in Annex 4, 
has some resemblance with the fact that, in a game with rational players, non-
cooperative solutions are, in general, more plausible than cooperative ones 
despite all the players knowing that, by non-cooperating, a worse result will be 
obtained than that which could be obtained when cooperation is in place. The 
explanatory key to this result is the fact that cooperative decisions are not 
credible and therefore are not equilibria as, in fact, the non-cooperative 
solutions, in general, are. The most interesting fact is indeed to recognise that 
not even full knowledge by players prevent the worse result to be the most 
plausible one. 
The existence of rational expectation also led to another result which is 
of particular importance in these fields (see Annex 5 for a formalization). In 
what concerns the so-called delegation problem, it was concluded that for 
society, in general, and for the economic authorities, in particular, it can be 
beneficial to delegate economic policy to agents with different characteristics 
from the ones of those authorities or of society, for example, a higher degree of 
aversion to inflation than that of society. In this sense, the question of the 
delegation of economic policies has also been associated to the question of the 
necessity (or not) of non-representative agents/entities but, in this case, not 
necessarily knowing more than those economic authorities. 
 
5. On increasing the knowledge of bounded rationality people by learning 
 
From those two approaches on expectations, it is our view that an intermediate 
approach is more appropriate, i.e. one that considers learning agents, which are 
boundedly rational. Generally speaking, learning models have been developed 
as a reasonable alternative to the unrealistic informational assumption of 
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rational expectations models. Moreover, through learning models it is possible 
to study the dynamics of adjustment between equilibria which, in most rational 
expectations models, is ignored. In fact, rational expectations hypotheses are, 
in some sense and with some exceptions, a limiting property of a dynamic 
system which evolves from one equilibrium to another, this being possible 
because it is assumed that agents know the true model of the economy and use 
it to form their expectations which, in turn, implies that agents are also able to 
solve the model. 
Interestingly, learning models also deal with another difficulty of 
rational expectations models, namely the existence of multiple equilibria. It is 
well known that for linear models, where only expectations of current variables 
are considered, the rational expectations equilibrium is unique. Conversely, 
when expectations about the future endogenous variables are required, 
multiple rational expectations equilibria can occur. Moreover, this is also a 
common feature of stochastic control/decision problems. In this case, the lack 
of equilibrium uniqueness arises from an imperfectly specified intertemporal 
decision problem under uncertainty. The analysis of learning processes can, in 
fact, provide a way of selecting the ‘reasonable’ equilibrium or sub-set of 
equilibria. On the one hand, if the learning mechanism is chosen optimally, then 
a desirable rational equilibrium is selected from the set of the rational 
expectations equilibria (see Marcet & Sargent 1988;1989a;1989b). On the 
other hand, if the learning mechanism is viewed under an adaptive approach, in 
particular in expectational stability models, it can also act as a selection criterion 
in multiple equilibria models involving bubbles and sunspots (see Evans, 1986; 
Evans & Guesnerie, 1993; Evans & Honkapohja, 1994;1995). To sum up, 
learning mechanisms, whether optimally or adaptively chosen, ‘select’ the 
particular steady state as, in some sense, terminal conditions do. 
Through this last point, one can already anticipate the usual distinction 
between learning mechanisms. Although a number of different studies 
modelling learning have been presented, two main classes of models can be 
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distinguished: rational learning and boundedly rational learning models.6 In 
rational learning models, it is assumed that agents know the true structural form 
of the model generating the economy, but not some of the parameters of that 
model. In boundedly rational learning models, it is assumed that agents, while 
learning is taking place, use a ‘reasonable’ rule, for instance, by considering the 
reduced form of the model. 
Rational learning, which some authors identify with Bayesian learning, 
thus assumes that the model structure is known by the agents while the 
learning process is taking place. Given the difficulties that arise in modelling 
this kind of learning, the bounded rationality approach has the appealing 
advantage of being (at least) more tractable. Moreover, the assumption that 
agents use a misspecified model during the learning process makes the 
bounded rationality approach less controversial. 
In the bounded rationality approach, various notions of expectational 
stability and of econometric learning procedures have been the main formulations. 
Interestingly, the distinction between these two main procedures has to do 
with the ‘notion’ of time where learning takes place. While the expectational 
stability principle assumes that learning takes place in ‘notional’, ‘virtual’ or 
meta-time, econometric learning procedures assume real-time learning. 
The expectational stability approach considers the influence of – and thus 
the distinction between – perceived laws on actual laws of motion of the 
economic system (see Annex 6 for a formalization). The actual law of motion 
results from the substitution of the perceived law of motion in the structural 
equations of the true model. It is then possible to obtain a mapping ( )θL  from 
the perceived to the actual law of motion, where θ  denotes the set of 
parameters. Rational expectations solutions θ  are then the fixed points of 
( )θL . Finally, a given rational expectations solution θ  is said to be 
                                                     
6 Westaway (1992) prefers to distinguish closed-loop learning, where agents learn about the parameters 
of the decision rule, from open-loop learning, where agents form an expectation of the path for a 
particular variable which they sequentially update. As is pointed out, closed-loop learning will be virtually 
identical to the parameter updating scheme using Kalman filtering. 
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expectationally-stable if the differential equation ( ) θθτθ −= Ldd  is locally 
asymptotically stable at θ , where τ  denotes meta-time. 
In adaptive real-time learning, agents are assumed to use an econometric 
procedure for estimating the perceived law of motion. Least-squares learning is 
widely used in this formulation in spite of its apparent drawbacks (see Salmon, 
1995, for a criticism of this issue). A more sophisticated application of these 
econometric procedures is the consideration of the Kalman filter which, as is 
well known, nests least squares learning and recursive least squares.7 
Notwithstanding those learning mechanisms, others have been 
proposed, which are in more coherence with the process of knowledge 
acquisition by agents that see their rationality bounded by some reason and, 
because of that, adopt a satisficing and adaptive behaviour à la Simon (see, 
among many others references, Simon, 1955). Salmon (1995) is, to the best of 
our knowledge, one of the very few references where an innovative bounded 
rationality approach such as neural networks learning has been applied in a 
policy-making problem. As it is well-known, (artificial) neural networks are 
simulations of how biological neurons are supposed to work, the structure of 
human brains, where processing units, the so-called neurons, are connected by 
sinapses, is approximated by these (artificial) neural networks.8 In this sense, 
neural networks can be classified as ‘non-structural’ procedural models. 
Furthermore, they are in good agreement with a typical characteristic of 
bounded rationality: the adaptive behaviour. Indeed, the adaptation to the 
environment as a crucial characteristic of a neural network makes it distinct 
from many (standard) models of learning.9 
                                                     
7 If agents never discount past information, then Kalman filtering can be seen as a rolling least-squares 
regression with an increasing sample. On the contrary, if past information becomes less important, then a 
‘forgetting factor’ can be included which gives a rolling window, or more precisely a form of weighted 
least squares. 
8 In Caleiro (2005) it is used this approach within a political business cycles context by considering that 
bounded rationality voters have to classify economic policies and outcomes as coming from opportunistic 
or from benevolent government behaviour. 
9 In particular, neural networks relax the constant linear reduced form assumption of least squares learning 
by considering a time varying possibly non-linear stochastic approximation of that reduced form. 
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6. A short conclusion and a long avenue for further studies on knowledge 
 
We would like to conclude by acknowledging the limitations of the present 
paper, which, in fact, had a simple goal of pointing out some (of the many 
more) – hopefully the most interesting ones – of the situations that are usually 
considered in Economics where knowledge plays a crucial role, even if only in 
an implicit way. Undoubtedly, those other situations can be considered in 
subsequent studies, which we would like to share with other sources of 
knowledge, e.g. other non-economical perspectives. In doing so, we would like 
to be in coerence to Sargent’s approach described as follows: 
 
“In the spirit of the bounded rationality research program, 
which is really to put the economist and the agents in his 
model on an equal behavioral footing, we expect that, in 
searching these literatures for ways to model our agents, we 
shall find ways to improve ourselves.” (Sargent, 1993: 33) 
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Annex 1 – The formalization of Friedman’s arguments 
 
Following Friedman (1953b), the main goal of a stabilization policy is the 
reduction in the variation of national income or output, y, in real terms and 
measured from its natural level. In accordance to Friedman, y can be 
decomposed in two components, z and v, such that yt = zt + vt, where zt would 
be the value for output in case of absence of stabilization policy (in fact, the 
policy that intends to stabilize output) and vt is the effect on output, at moment 
t, of that economic policy, independently of the date of its implementation. 
This means that vt reflects the measures taken before t, at t, and even after t if 
the Government previously announces the decisions that will take after t. 
Considering the variance as a measure of the magnitude of the 
variations, we have that 
2 2 2 2y z v z vrσ σ σ σ σ= + + , 
where σi, (i = y, z, v), represents the standard deviation of the variable i, and r 
is correlation coefficient between z and v. The higher 2yσ  is the higher is the 
variation in output. The same type of interpretation can be made in relation to 
2
zσ  and 
2
vσ . But, in relation to 
2
vσ , this variance can be seen as also a measure 
of the intensity of the stabilization policy. The more intense are the stabilizing 
measures the higher is the impact on the evolution of output, that is, the 
higher are the fluctuations in v. Thus, a large variance 2vσ  means a strong 
actuation with intentions of stabilization. The correlation coefficient r takes, as 
it is known, values between -1 and +1. A negative value for r means that high 
(resp. low) values of zt are associated with low (resp. high) values of vt. Thus, r 
can be seen as a measure of opportunity/timing of the effect of the stabilization 
policy. In order that this policy effectively reduce the fluctuations in output it 
must have a positive impact if output was to be low in case of not being 
implemented that policy, and one negative impact if output was to be high, in 
case of not being implemented that policy. Thus, the correct 
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opportunity/timing corresponds to a negative correlation coefficient. 
Notwithstanding the policy exerting its effect at the correct moment this 
does not guarantee the stabilization in output. One notices that the problem is 
not necessarily the signal of the effect, that can, indeed be known, but rather if 
when the policy will be exerting its effects these will be the desired ones. This 
is to say that, even if the policy has positive (resp. negative) effects when those 
would be necessary, those effects can be in magnitude such that it makes 
increase (resp. lower) too much output, consequently verifying a higher 
variation than that would be observed without being made use of any 
stabilization measures. 
To sum up, only with r = -1 and σz = σv, we have 
2 0yσ = , i.e. a full 
successful stabilization policy. In order to achieve some stabilization effect, 
2 2
y zσ σ< , which means 2v zrσ σ< − , and this will happen only if r < 0. 
Nevertheless, even if r < 0, the magnitude of the effects cannot be too strong. 
A counting of all the possible cases led Friedman to recommend a policy 
leading to constant effects 02 =vσ  as the one that more plausibly would not be 
a source of instability. 
 
Annex 2 – A formalization of the differences between adaptive and rational 
expectations 
 
In order to verify the possible differences between rational and adaptive 
expectations let us assume a stylised model based upon an aggregate supply 
curve as follows: 
( )ettt yy pipiα −+= ,     (1) 
where yt denotes output, whose natural level is y , α is a positive parameter, 
and pit denotes the inflation rate, whose expected level is 
e
tpi . 
If the economic authorities consider targets for the output level and 
inflation such as, respectively, yy >~  and 0, their objective function can be: 
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( ) 22~ tt yyL βpi+−= ,     (2) 
where β is the relative degree of inflation aversion. 
Given an expected rate of inflation, the minimization of society’s loss 
(2) subject to the model (1) ruling the functioning of the economy leads to: 
( )
.
~
2
2
2
e
tt
yy
piβα
α
βα
α
pi
+
+
+
−
=     (3) 
 
In case of rational expectations, [ ]tet E pipi = , which means that 
[ ] ( ) ,~
2
2
2
e
t
e
tt
yy
E pipiβα
α
βα
α
pi =
+
+
+
−
=  
leading to 
( )
β
α
pi
yye
t
−
=
~
 
and, obviously, to 
( )
.
~
β
α
pi
yy
t
−
=
10 
This discretionary solution can also be obtained as the limit of the 
solution corresponding to adaptive expectations. In case of adaptive 
expectations of the type 1−= t
e
t pipi , expression (3) transforms into a first order 
difference equation 
( )
,
~
12
2
2 −+
+
+
−
= tt
yy
piβα
α
βα
α
pi  
whose steady-state solution is: 
( )
.
~
β
α
pi
yy
t
−
=  
 
Annex 3 – A formalization of the irrelevance of economic policies 
 
                                                     
10 Note that the equality between the actual level of inflation and the expected one is achieved a posteriori. 
If this equality was considered a priori – like it would be in the, so-called, rules solution – then, clearly, a 
better result could be obtained as inflation would be at a zero level whereas output would be (also) at the 
natural level. 
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In what concerns the irrelevance of economic policies, let us consider the 
following model. Let 
t
d
t bPaY +=  
be the equation of aggregate demand, where Pt represents the general level of 
prices. The introduction of an instrumental variable xt, as well as some 
stochastic shock, ut, affecting demand leads to 
ttt
d
t ucxbPaY +++= . 
In relation to aggregate supply, let us consider that 
( ) tettst vPPdYY +−+= , 
where Y  represents the potential or natural level of output, etP  represents the 
expected value of the level of prices, at moment t, and vt represents a stochastic 
shock affecting supply. 
Plainly, when considering only the demand side of the economy, the 
economic policy is (on average) efficient as, in general, will be possible to use 
xt in order to (on average) achieve a target level for income, say Y
~ . Clearly, this 
result depends upon the knowledge (or not) of the realization of the demand 
shock ut before the determination of the value to be assumed by xt. 
That result on the efficacy of economic policies is indeed challenged 
when introducing the supply side of the economy, by that also meaning the 
knowledge that is assumed to be present in the determination of expectations. 
Going over the mathematical details, it is possible to verify that when 
assuming a rational use of the information, i.e. the knowledge that is available 
when determining the level of prices that will clear the market, output will 
follow the expression: 
db
dubv
YY ttt
−
−
=− , 
which shows that output will only differ from its potential level in result of the 
existence of random factors, by that meaning the irrelevance, i.e. the complete 
inefficacy of the economic policies. 
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Annex 4 – A formalization of the time inconsistency of decisions 
 
The time inconsistency of economic policies, in particular, or decisions, in 
general, is a phenomenon that can be, as well, related with the level of 
knowledge. To put it clearer, the decisions suffer from that problem when 
being determined for one (future) moment t, are no longer optimal as the 
result of time passage, which is a question that appears associated, normally, to 
the existence of rational expectations. In this particular case, economic policies 
are not considered credible when they are time-inconsistent. The model that 
follows illustrates this basic question. 
Let us consider that the economic authorities consider the level of (real) 
output and the inflation rate, as objective variables, in such a way that the 
utility function is: 
21
2 t t
W ypi α= − + , 
where, in accordance with an aggregate supply curve, 
( )et t ty y β pi pi= + − . 
In this in case it is easy to verify that, for any expected rate of inflation, 
the optimal inflation rate is pit = αβ. This corresponds to the so called 
discretionary solution. Any another decision, namely pit = 0, that would 
correspond to the rules solution, is not considered credible as it suffers from 
time inconsistency. This is so because the economic policy that would lead to 
the best result would be, indeed, to promise to choose pit = 0, in order to 
influence the expectations in a favourable way, i.e. to make 0=etpi , but later 
choosing pit = αβ. This would be the so-called cheating solution. 
 
Annex 5 – A formalization of the delegation of policies solution 
 
In order to formalize the argument on the delegation of policies let us follow, 
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for instance, Lippi & Swank (1999), and assume that the preferences of the 
economic authorities (and also of the society) can be represented by the following 
loss function: 
22 uL βpi += ,    (4) 
where pi and u represent the inflation and unemployment rates, respectively. 
The parameter β indicates the relative cost, for the economic authorities being 
representative agents of society’s objectives, of unemployment in relation to 
inflation. The smaller is β the higher is the degree of aversion to the inflation, 
i.e. 1/β. One then says that the smaller is β the more conservative will be the 
agent responsible for the economic policy. 
In what concerns the functioning of the economy, let us consider that the 
unemployment rate, u, deviates from its natural value, un for two kinds of 
reasons: (i) when the inflation rate, pi, deviates from its expected value pie; and 
(ii) when there are shocks (in the productivity), ε, which are considered of 
random nature, with null average and variance 2εσ . If this is so, the curve of 
Phillips that follows intends to be the representative model in the way of 
functioning of the economy: 
( ) εpipiθ +−+= enuu .    (5) 
The minimization of the objective function (4) subject to the restriction 
(5), given an expected rate of inflation, leads to: 
( )
21 βθ
εθpiβθ
pi
+
++
=
e
nu . 
As in equilibrium, pie = E[pi | I t -1], then pi
e = βθ un, which means 
εβθ
βθβθpi
21+
+= nu . 
This expression shows that, besides the use of inflation as form of reaction to 
the shocks, i.e. a correct use of the discretionary economic policy, the economic 
authorities generate an unnecessary inflating bias, βθun, which is an appalling 
component of the discretionary economic policy. To eliminate the inflating 
bias, the economic authorities would have to be the most conservative ones, 
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i.e. β = 0, but that also would mean no reaction to the shocks. The question in 
place is, then, to know if there exists another agent, more conservative than 
society, for which the resultant return on a diminished appalling component 
more than compensates the resultant loss from a worse reaction to the shocks. 
If this is the case then for the economic authorities themselves, as well as for 
society, is advantageous, given its objective function (4), to delegate the 
economic policy to an agent (central bank) more conservative, say a with a 
smaller parameter of aversion to unemployment - let us call βi to it. 
Avoiding the mathematical details, it is possible to show that, for the 
economic authorities, i.e. for society itself, the optimal agent to whom the economic 
policy should be delegated is characterized by a βi satisfying the expression: 
( ) ( ) ,01 2322 =−++ ββσθββ ε iiniu  
which shows that, indeed, the delegation of the monetary policy in an agent 
more conservative than society is, on average, advantageous for the society, 
whenever the natural unemployment rate is positive (i.e. higher than the ideal 
one). 
 
Annex 6 – The formalization of learning 
 
Following Evans & Guesnerie (1993) and Evans & Honkapohja (1995), let us 
suppose that some state variable, ty , depends upon its own expectations, 
]|[ 1−ttyE I , plus being influenced by some control variable, tx , which, in turn, is 
generated by a first-order auto-regressive process, i.e. 
tttt cxybEay ++= − ]|[ 1I  
and 
,1 ttt xx ερ += −  
where 0>ρ  is a measure of inertia in the systematic utilisation of the 
instruments i.e. some kind of policy rule and tε  is a discretionary policy shock 
assumed to be i.i.d. with finite variance. 
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Let us assume also that at time t  agents believe that ty  follows the 
stochastic process: 
tntnnt xy εϕβα ++= −1     (6) 
where n  indexes the period over which expectations are revised. 
If agents believe that (6) is the structure of the relation between the 
state and the control variables, their expectations of y for period t  given the 
information available in 1−t  will be given by 
.]|[ 11 −− += tnntt xyE βαI     (7) 
But the way in which expectations are formed will affect the actual 
evolution of the state variable. This implies that ty  will be generated by 
.)()(
)(
1
11
ttnn
tttnnt
xcbba
cxcxbay
ερβα
ερβα
++++=
++++=
−
−−     (8) 
From there it is evident that the learning process of agents must be taken 
into account. Unless the economy has achieved a rational expectations 
equilibrium, i.e. when 
,
1111
]|[ 111 tttttt cx
b
c
b
a
yx
b
c
b
a
IyE ε
ρρ
+
−
+
−
=⇒
−
+
−
=
−−−
 
then believed values of the state variable (6) will not be the same as the actual 
ones (8). We can assume that agents will realise that their rule (7) is leading 
them to forecast errors and so will revise it accordingly. One simple way to 
formalise this revision process is to admit that at time 1+n  a new reduced 
form rule will be generated as follows: 
.1111 tntnnt xy εϕβα +−++ ++=     (9) 
Relating (8) with (9) we derive the learning process of agents to be 
characterised by 
.),(),( 111 ccbba nnnnn =+=+= +++ ϕρββαα  
If 1<b  the learning process for nα  and nβ  will eventually converge to 
the rational expectations parameters 1)1( −−ba  and 1)1( −−bc , respectively. 
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However, if 1>b  the learning process will diverge, leading to an obvious 
dynamic divergence of the economic system. 
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